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If this is so then of course the cluster theory principle (CD) is false.
One case which Kripke gives in arguing for the just-quoted claim is that of a speaker s who uses the name 'Godel' and whose sole answer to the question 'Who are you referring to?' would be 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. Kripke asks us to suppose that no one discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. Perhaps the proof miraculously appeared on a sheet of paper. Perhaps a subtle error in Gbdel's argument has not yet been noticed. Nevertheless, Kripke claims, our speaker s would still be referring to Gbdel with his name. If this claim is correct, then (CD) is false.
Another case which Kripke gives is one in which again a speaker uses 'Godel' and associates with this name only the description 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. But in this case, we are to suppose that it was not Godel but someone else who first proved incompleteness. As Kripke puts it, we are to suppose that "a man named 'Schmidt', whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Godel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was thereafter attributed to Godel." Kripke then claims: "So, since the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we, when we talk about 'Godel', are in fact always referring to Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not.
We simply are not" ([4], p. 294).
Apparently, Kripke means that in this case, we are referring to Godel. If so, and if he is right, then again (CD) is false. However, his main point in giving this example is to show that cluster theories do not provide the correct sufficient conditions for name reference. (All we know if (CD) is false is that they do not provide the correct necessary conditions.) We obtain this result since in this case we are dealing with a one-membered cluster. Here, if Kripke is right, an individual's uniquely satisfying all the members of a name-use's associated cluster is not sufficient for that individual to be the use's referent.
Kripke considers a reply that might be made to his Godel-Schmidt case, namely, that the speaker might have had some other description in mind which Godel does satisfy. Suppose he had in mind the description 'the man to whom the discovery of incompleteness is commonly attributed'. Kripke answers this reply by saying that the same sort of counterexample as he has already given applies here as well. The speaker might still be referring to Codel even if, unbeknownst to him, the discovery is now commonly attributed to Schmidt ([4], p. 296).
There is something puzzling about this objection which Kripke imagines might be made to his case. For how exactly is it supposed to be relevant? After all, the initial case was one in which there were no descriptions which the speaker associated with 'Coder other than 'the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic'. So what is the point of suggesting that the speaker might have associated some other description with 'Codel'? Surely, the point is not that some case other than the one Kripke gives would not provide a counterexample to cluster theories. For this point, though true, has no bearing on the issue of whether the case Kripke does give provides a counterexample. Perhaps the point of the reply is this. In the sort of case Kripke imagines, one in which the user of 'Codel' believes he is referring to the man who discovered arithmetic's incompleteness, it is natural to assume that the user would also have various other beliefs about the referent, beliefs yielding further properties in the cluster associated with the use. Consider for instance the properties mentioned in the descriptions: This point is well taken. For suppose that Kripke had described his case so as to explicitly rule out certain of (a)-(d) as being in the cluster which s associates with 'Godel'. Imagine, for instance, thats uses 'Godel' with the intention of referring to the discoverer of incompleteness, but s believes both that he has never in his life heard of anyone named 'Godel' and that he has never heard the proof of incompleteness attributed to anyone named 'Godel'. What would s be doing using 'Godel' in such circumstances? We can only assume that by some wild coincidence s just happened to pick the name 'Godel' and decided to use it to refer to the discoverer of incompleteness (perhaps he just happened to like the sound of 'Godel ). If we assume that Schmidt rather than Godel proved incompleteness, who is s referring to with 'Godel'? The intuitively correct answer now is Schmidt, not Godel. Or, if we assume that no one proved incompleteness, it is now intuitively correct that s is referring to no one with 'Godel'.
It is clear, then, that Kripke has given no counterexample to cluster theories at all. For suppose, on the one hand, that the only assumption of Kripke's Godel-cases is that the cluster associated with the speaker's use of 'Godel' is one-membered and contains just the property of having discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. Then, as we've just seen, it is natural to suppose that the speaker is referring with 'Godel' to whomever made this discovery, and we have no counterexample to (CD). Suppose, on the other hand, that Kripke makes other unmentioned assumptions about his cases, assumptions which lead him to reach different conclusions than the ones we reached in the previous paragraph. For all we know these assumptions are such that if they were made explicit, they would yield cases in which the claim that Godel is the referent of 'Godel' is consistent with (CD). Again we have no counterexample to (CD). (c) ). The claim that Strawson's device might yield the "wrong" results when the speaker misremembers from whom he got his reference was considered before in connection with Kripke's objection to the use of (a).
We may conclude that Kripke has offered no relevant objection to the reply to his 'Godel'-cases that the user of 'Godel' would probably have had other properties in mind that Godel does uniquely satisfy. Thus his cases do not pose conclusive counterexamples to the cluster theory principle (CD). Nor does his
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Cbdel-Schmidt case show that no cluster theory will provide the sufficient conditions for name-reference.
Searle has said that the clusters of properties which determine the reference of a name are composed of those properties most "commonly attributed"to the referent ([7], p. 160) . Similarly, Strawson suggests that the cluster will provide a "composite description incorporating the most frequently mentioned facts" ([10], p. 196) . But Kripke's 'Godel'-cases show that one who wishes to maintain a cluster theory of names will have to allow that properties which are not frequently attributed by use of the name, properties such as that of being a man named 'Godel' of whom a particular speaker has heard, may nevertheless play a decisive role in determining reference. Kripke In addition to holding (SD), Russell also seems to have believed that a name, as used on a given occasion, has the same meaning as the definite description which could be used to express the proposition of which the speaker is thinking at the time of use. That is, Russell seems to have held a "short-for-descriptions" theory of names. But one can hold (SD) without believing that names are used as short for definite descriptions. Theories which hold (SD) while denying that names are short for descriptions I call "fixed-by-attributes" theories.
As we have seen, the reason why Kripke's cases are ineffective against the cluster theory principle (CD) is that these cases show at most that an object may be the referent of a name-use without uniquely satisfying a particular property in the use's associated cluster, while to show (CD) is false, it is necessary to show that an object may be the referent of a name-use while uniquely satisfying none of the properties in the cluster. However, to show that (SD) is false, it is only necessary to show that the referent of a name-use may fail to uniquely satisfy one particular member of the cluster, namely, the property mentioned in the description by use of which the speaker's thought at the time would be expressed. Thus, for all we know so far, Kripke's cases might prove effective against single-description theories. Let us consider this possibility with respect to the Godel-Schmidt case. Given Kripke's official description of this case, it has no effect on single-description theories either, since on this description, we are to make the special assumption that the only way in which the speaker would attempt to pick out the referent of his use would be as "the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic/' This assumption makes Kripke's case an atypical use of 'G6del', so that, as we have seen, it is far from clear that Godel would in fact be the referent of such a use had Schmidt proved incompleteness.
However, it is apparent that Kripke makes the unofficial assumption that in his case, the user of 'Godel' is a typical user of this name, someone who has heard and read of a certain famous logician named 'Godel', who has heard the incompleteness proof attributed to this man by use of this name, and so on. Suppose Jones is such a typical user of 'Godel' who on a given occasion says The assumptions of our case, then , do not provide evidence that Jones is thinking of a proposition about Godel having the form of (2) when he says (1). But given these assumptions, it is intuitively correct that Jones is referring to Godel in his utterance of (1). Consequently, referring to an object with a name does not entail thinking of a proposition expressible by use of a definite description which refers to that object. Otherwise, evidence that a person is referring to an object with a name would always be evidence that the person is thinking of a proposition expressible by a description which refers to that object, and as we have seen, this is not always the case. Hence, (SD) is false, and no single-description view is true. 
